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Abstract
In the classical herding model, asymptotic learning refers to situations where in-
dividuals eventually take the correct action regardless of their private information.
Classical results identify classes of information structures for which such learning oc-
curs. Recent papers have argued that typically, even when asymptotic learning occurs,
it takes a very long time. In this paper related questions are referred. The paper stud-
ies whether there is a natural family of information structures for which the time it
takes until individuals learn is uniformly bounded from above. Indeed, we propose
a simple bi-parametric criterion that defines the information structure, and on top of
that compute the time by which individuals learn (with high probability) for any pair
of parameters. Namely, we identify a family of information structures where individ-
uals learn uniformly fast.
The underlying technical tool we deploy is a uniform convergence result on a newly
introduced class of ‘weakly active’ supermartingales. This result extends an earlier
result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) on active supermartingales.
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1 Introduction
Oftentimes, when individuals make decisions, they rely on their private information as well as on
previous decisions that other individuals have made. Observational learning models have been
studied on purpose to formalize and analyze this insightful behavior. The paradigmatic setup of the
model (e.g. Bikhchandani et al. (1992)) includes an infinite sequence of individuals who choose
actions with the objective to match the unknown (binary) state of the world. Each individual
receives a private information which is iid conditioned on the underlying state, and in addition to
that, observes the entire sequence of earlier actions.
Smith and Sorensen (2000) has drawn a significant attention to the scenario where the private
information is arbitrarily strong (unbounded in their jargon). Informally, each individual may
obtain (with positive probability) a private information in favor to one state that will overturn any
strong evidence in favor to the contrary one. In other words, an individual’s posterior belief can
be set arbitrarily close to zero or one. When the private information is unbounded and all actions
are publicly observed, Smith and Sorensen (2000) have shown that asymptotic learning occurs
with probability one: individuals eventually find it optimal to ‘forsake’ their private information
and reiterate the correct action.1
Asymptotic rates of convergence are an important ingredient in the study of inference pro-
cesses in economical and statistical theory. Nevertheless, the subject matter regarding the speed
at which asymptotic learning converges has been paid a limited attention in the literature. This
speed is measured by how ’quick’ the public belief evolves as more actions are unfolded over time.
Since the public belief is the posterior belief that an individual assigns to the correct state of na-
ture, it provides a measure of how well the individuals has learned the state; As formalized in
Smith and Sorensen (2000), who show that whenever the private informations are unbounded,
the public belief approaches to one. This property has led to some additional evidence regarding
the ‘slow’ speed of the convergence (see for example the recent paper by Hann-Caruthers et al.
(2017)). Motivated by this, we are challenged to identify the private information structural’s con-
ditions for which the aforementioned convergences not only happen ‘quickly’ but in a uniform
rate. To that end, we revisit the notion of informativeness.
Private informations must not perfectly reveal the state of the world. This ensures that any
(set of) informations which is possible in regard to one state, is possible in regard to the other
state. In addition to that, private informations are assumed to rule out trivialities in the sense that
some (set of) informations is measured differently with respect to the states. As a supplemental
assumption, the last property is refined in the following manner.
1The rationale behind this learning is that, whenever a sequence of incorrect actions is unfolding there exist individuals
who will eventually put an end to it regardless of their belief assigned to the incorrect state.
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Recall that private information is naturally associated with a pair of distributions correspond-
ing to the set of states of the world. Informally, we focus on a certain wide classes of such pairs
which induced learning admits a ‘quick’ and uniform rate of convergence. Most notably, each class
is identified as bi-parametric, represented by ψ and ν in (0,1), such that the point-wise absolute
distance between one of which pairs decreases in a uniform bounded rate which is merely deter-
mined by these parameters. In particular, ψ plays as an initial constrain whereas ν determines
the bounded rate parameter of converges.
Additionally, in order to exploit the state conditional stochastic properties, we embrace a sub-
stantial portion of the literature’s setting and consider the ratio process between the corresponding
posterior beliefs. This process is shown to converge ‘quickly’ as the distance between the corre-
sponding pairs decreases fast. Our main result shows that one of which ratio processes corre-
sponding to the same bi-parametric class identification, represented by some ψ and ν, converges
‘quickly’ and in a uniform bounded rate which is solely determined byψ and ν. It is further argued
that, once we relax the bi-parametric constrain, the ratio process may converge very slow.
It is well known (Smith and Sorensen (2000)) that the ratio process is a state conditional
martingale (and hence it is a suprmartingale) which converges to the correct cascade set with
probability one. We introduce a new class of supermartingales, called weakly active, where one of
which process admits a ‘high’ rate of convergence which is bounded from below by
ψ
(t+1)v
, for any
given ψ and ν at each time t.
Our ancillary results are mathematical; we show that these classes of supermartingales, iden-
tified byψ and ν, converge uniformly. Specifically, given a precision value ε, there exits a constant
time K , which entirely depends on ψ, ν and ε, such that with high 1− ε probability the wholly
processes in the associated class (uniformly) fall and remain below ε from time K onward.
An important adjunct result shows that there is a one to one correspondence between the
classes of ‘weakly active’ supermartingales and the classes of bi-parametric private information
structures. In particular we show that any ratio process which is uniquely induced from a bi-
parametric class, identified ψ and ν, is a weakly active supermatingale defined by the same pa-
rameters.
Finally, as learning is merely asymptotically approachable, the wrong action may be coordi-
nated with a positive probability at any finite time. In particular, the sequence of actions may not
settle on the correct action from some finite time onward andmore rigorously, it may require an un-
reasonable amount of time to put an end of a sequence of incorrect actions. Rosenberg and Vieille
(2017) consider the following two criteria; Whereas one benchmark looks at how long is needed
until an individual takes the correct action, the (closely related) other one measures the total
number of incorrect actions. Rosenberg and Vieille (2017) view the finite expectation of these
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benchmarks as a simple and natural proxy of efficiency and provide a simple condition regarding
information structure to verify it.
While their (necessary) condition for efficiency involves a finite indefinite integral regarding
the unconditional private information’s distribution, this criterion is surprisingly captured by the
informativeness approach taken here in the following rigorous form; We show that the aforemen-
tioned expected times, corresponding to any bi-parametric class of information identified by ψ
and ν, are not only finite but uniformly bounded by a constant which solely depends on ψ and ν
and is independent of the distribution’s specification in this class.
1.1 Results
We introduce a new class of inforamtive structures which are characterized as bi-parametric. We
show that the stochastic ratio processes induced by these classes are identified by classes of super-
martingales which are shown to admit a uniform bound on the rate of convergence. Additionally,
we argue that once the informativeness assumption is relaxed, then either a ‘fast’ convergence
occurs or the associated private information distributions are sufficiently ‘close’, yielding that less
information about the true state of the world is obtained.
As the stochastic ratio process converges ‘slowly’, it is commonly associated with a variety of
efficiency indications. In particular, under the proposed bi-parametric constrain, we show that
the expected times of the first incorrect action as well as the total number of incorrect actions are
finite and uniformly bounded.
1.2 Related literature
Chamley (2004) provides an estimation for the the public belief unfolding in case for which the
associated private information distributions admit ’fat tails’ in his jargon. He also reports some nu-
merical evidence in the Gaussian case using a computer simulation. Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017)
argue that the rate growth of the result in ratio process, associated with individuals who observe
actions, is sub-exponentially close.
Vives (1993), studies the speed of sequential learning in a model with actions chosen from a
continuumwhere individuals observe an information with error term regarding their predecessors’
actions. He similarly shows that learning is significantly slower than in the threshold case (for
further overview of this literature please refer to Vives (2010), Chapter 6). For specific information
structure, some bounds on the probability that an individual takes the incorrect action have been
established. Under the assumption that private informations are uniformly distributed, Lobel et al.
(2009) establish upper bounds on this probability, where Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017) provide a
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lower bound, under the assumption that private informations are normally distributed, and all
previous actions are publicly observed.
Much of the literature has focused on the long-term outcomes of learning. As aforestated,
when private informations are unbounded, the individuals eventually choose the correct action
with probability one. Hence, a natural question one may arise is how long does it take for that to
happen and study its expectation.
Smith and Sorensen (1996), an early version of Smith and Sorensen (2000), addressed this
issue showing that the expected time to learn is infinite for some private information structures.
They further conjecture that this result is extended to an arbitrary structure, which on the contrary,
is shown to be false. Rosenberg and Vieille (2017) have studied related questions. In particular,
they identify a simple condition on the unconditional private information distributions for which
the expected times until the first correct action, as well as the number of incorrect actions, are
finite. Furthermore, Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017) poses a different assumption on the conditional
private information distributions’ tails for which the expected time to learn is finite.
Those two approaches are distilled here collectively as the aforementioned expected times are
captured under our new informativeness notion.
2 Model
The general framework includes the Nature who chooses a binary state of the world within S =
{L,H}. For notional simplicity both states are assumed to be drawn likely. A sequence of short-
lived individuals make decisions in turn. In round t, an individual t chooses an action from the
set A= {1, ...,m, ...,M} with the objective of matching the underlying unknown state .
Let U : S × A −→ R be a payoff function. In each state s ∈ {L,H} an individual earns a
payoff U(s,m) from the action m and seeks to maximize his payoff. It is assumed that U(H,m) is
increasing in m whereas U(L,m) is decreasing, and in particular no action is optimal over another
at one belief. This will avoid that no pair of actions provides identical payoffs in all states. It
will further ensure that each individual has two extreme actions, each is strictly optimal in some
state. Particularly, action M is optimal for H where action 1 is optimal for L. The remaining M −2
actions are taken when the state’s belief is not certain.
Private belief: Each individual receives a random signal about the true state of the world
and then uses Bayes rule to compute his private belief.2 Conditional on the states H, L, a pri-
vate belief (rather then a signal) is drawn iid according to some cdfs: F L , F H , respectively. It
2We adopt the common literature terminology and refer to that belief as the private information an individual assigns
to the states, given his own information.
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is further assumed that F L , F H have a common support, say supp(F), such that the convex hull
co(supp(F)) ≡ [b
−
,
−
b] ⊆ [0,1] for some 0< b
−
<
−
b< 1.
Two additional extreme restrictions must be posed on F L and F H ; No private belief perfectly
reveals the true state of the world. Formally, F L ∼ F H , or equivalently, the Radon-Nikodym f =
dF L
dFH
exists and is finite on supp(F).3 For the second restriction it is assumed that some signals
are informative; for avoiding triviality F L and F H must not coincide. Formally, b
−
< 12 <
−
b, this
rules out that f = 1 a.s. A private belief is said to be bounded if 0 < b
−
<
−
b< 1, and it is called
unbounded whenever co(supp(F)) ≡ [b
−
,
−
b] = [0,1].
Posterior belief: Given a posterior belief r ∈ [0,1] that the true state is H, the expected payoff
for choosing action m is rU(H,m) + (1− r)U(L,m). As each individual maximizes his expected
payoff, U and r naturally induce a unique thresholds:
0= r0 < r1 < ... < rM = 1 (1)
so that each interval Im := [rm−1, rm] is associated with an optimal action m that the expected
payoff of choosing action m is maximal. Additionally, in equilibrium, each individual can compute
the probability that the state is H after any history of choices of all previous individuals. This
probability is referred to the public belief and is denoted by q. Applying Bayes rule for a given
public belief q and a private belief p, the posterior belief r that the state is H satisfies
r = r(p,q) =
pq
pq+ (1− p)(1− q)
. (2)
Game timing: For each t, individual t observes his private signal and all actions of previous
individuals, using Bayes rule he then updates his posterior belief and chooses an action which
maximizes his payoff accordingly.
Threshold: Since the right hand side of (2) is increasing in p, there are private belief thresholds
0= p0(q) ≤ p1(q)≤ ... ≤ pM (q) = 1, (3)
corresponding to inequalities (1) so that, given q, an individual chooses the action m if and only
if his private belief p ∈ (pm−1(q), pm(q)]. Equality (2) further implies that each threshold pm(q)
is decreasing in q.
Cascade set: Each action m is associated with a set of public beliefs Jm = {q| supp(F) ⊆
(pm−1(q), pm(q)]}. Hence, an individual takes an action m almost surely whenever q ∈ int(Jm).
3F H ∼ F L implies that F H(p)> 0 if and only if F L(p)> 0 at any point p in supp(F ).
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2.1 Asymptotic learning
Let qt be the public belief that the state is H which, using Bayes rule, is updated accordingly after
individual t chooses an action. Conceptually, since we are interested in the conditional stochastic
properties that the state is H, it is more convenience to consider the public likelihood ratio lt ≡
1−qt
qt
that the state is L versus H.
The following analogues can then be inferred; for each q the public belief thresholds are
p¯m(
(1−q)
q ) = pm(q); for each posterior belief r ∈ Im if and only if
(1−r)
r ∈ I¯m := [
1−rm−1
rm−1
,
1−rm
rm
];
and for each cascade set q ∈ Jm if and only if
(1−q)
q ∈ J¯m.
By (Smith and Sorensen (2000), Lemma 2) we know that, with unbounded belief, J¯1 = {∞}
and J¯M = {0}, where all the other cascade sets are empty. Moreover, conditional on the state
H, lt is a converges martingale with lt → J¯M = {0}, and hence fully correct asymptotic learning
(lt → ∞) occurs almost surely (for further details please refer to Smith and Sorensen (2000),
Lemma 3).
Since, conditional on lt , an individual t chooses the action m if and only if his private belief
pt ∈ [p¯m−1, p¯m], it follows that the corresponding likelihood public belief at time t + 1, lt+1, is
updated according to the likelihood posterior belief
(1−rt )
rt
. Hence, as each state is equally likely, it
is natural to describe the stochastic process L˜ := {lt}t≥0 iteratively via
lt+1 = lt
ρ(·|lt , L)
ρ(·|lt ,H)
, l0 ≡ 1 (4)
where the transition
ρ(m|l, s) = F s(pm(l))− F
s(pm−1(l)), (5)
is the probability that an individual takes the action m given l where the true state is s ∈ {H, L}.
Consequently, the cascade set J¯m is the interval of the likelihoods l such that
ρ(m|l,H) = ρ(m|l, L) = 1, (6)
and further, as the likelihood posterior belief jumps above one whenever an individual follows an
incorrect action, it can be inferred that for every partial sequence of actions a1, ...,at+1,
lt+1(a1, ...,at+1) = lt(a1, ...,at )
ρ(at+1|lt , L)
ρ(·at+1lt ,H)
> 1if and only if at+1 = 1.
3 Uniform estimation
Recall that a pair of cdfs, (F L , F H ), together with an initial probability P(H) = P(L) = 12 induce
a unique stochastic process lt which satisfies equation (4). Additionally, recall that when F
L , F H
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are unbounded, lt converges almost surly to the cascade set J¯M = {0} corresponding to the true
action M . As the transitions converge to one, by (6), the process lt decays ‘slowly’ to zero (For
suplemental details please refer to Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017), Theorems 1,2). Hence, we are
motivated to establish a class of processes which will not only dismantle, in some extent, this
‘sluggishness’ convergence in moderation, but admit a uniform rate of converges. To capture this
idea let us consider the following class of unbounded private beliefs cdfs.
Each pair (F L , F H ) is equipped with the following iterative deterministic sequence: l˜t+1 =
l˜t
ρ(M |l˜ t ,L)
ρ(Ml˜ t ,H)
started at l˜0 = 1. In words, for each t ≥ 0 the value of l˜t is associated with a particular
partial history of choices in which all individuals, from day one to t, pick the correct action M .
Hence, (l˜t)t≥0 is monotone decreasing to zero and the random variable lt admits l˜t ≤ lt for all
t ≥ 0. In addition, let us denote by ∆(p) = |F L(p) − F H(p)| to be the distance between two
corresponding cdf′s at p.
Definition 1. Let ψ,ν ∈ (0,1). A pair of unbounded private beliefs cdf’s, (F L , F H ), is (ψ,ν) -
informative if
∆(pM−1(l˜t)) >
ψ
(t + 1)ν
(7)
for all t ≥ 0.
In order to justify the information structure in which the private belief p (rather than private
signal) is iid conditioned on the underlying state, the following correspondence must arise from
Bayesian updating: f (p) = (1− p)/p almost surely in (0,1). This immediately implies that ∆(p)
is non-decreasing as p < 1/2, and furthermore, since it is strict whenever p ∈ supp(F) \ {1/2}, it
follow that F H < F L , except when both terms are 0 or 1. For further details please refer to Lemma
A.1 in Smith and Sorensen (2000).
Therefore, the (ψ,ν) - informativeness assumption entails the following restriction: whereas
∆(p)weakly decreases as p tends to zero, this distance, on a particular sample sequence l˜t , cannot
decay too slowly but at rate of at least
ψ
(t+1)ν
. A pair of cdfs which complies with this restriction
admits thick (weakly monotonic) tails.
Furthermore, since the thresholds {pM−1(l)}l≥0 are strictly decreasing to zero then the mono-
tonic of ∆(p) together with (7) yield
∆(pM−1(lt)) ≥∆(pM−1(l˜t)) >
ψ
(t + 1)ν
(8)
for all t ≥ 0.
The next theorem provides a characterization of unbounded private beliefs. Notably, the con-
struction includes a wide class of distributions which complies with Definition (1). In particular,
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it is argued that when the distance between the tails of F L and F H are sufficiently thick then the
(conditional) probability that strong signals vanishes slowly enough is high. Hereinafter, PH is
referred to the conditional probability which by F H .
Theorem 1. For all ψ,ν ∈ (0,1) there exists a pair (F L , F H) which is (ψ,ν) - informative.
The proof of Theorem 1 is supplemented to the Appendix. In the next theorem we establish a
uniform bound on the rate of the convergence corresponding to any process lt which is induced
by (ψ,ν) - informative private beliefs. The theorem asserts that all such processes decay at a rate
which is uniformly bounded.
Theorem 2. Let ε,ψ,ν ∈ (0,1). Then for all L¯ < 1 there is a finite time K = K(ψ,ν,ε) such that
for all pairs (F L , F H ) which are (ψ,ν) - informative there is a PH - probability of at least (1− ε)
that
lt < L¯
for all t > K .
In words, the uniformity theorem asserts that given (ψ,ν) and a precision ε, there exists a
constant time K , which depends only on these three parameters, such that after exactly first K
guesses not only that the likelihood public belief process at time K + 1, lK+1, falls below ε near
the cascade set but, due to the fact that pM−1(lt) is decreasing in t, pM−1(lK+1) is near zero and
hence an individual K + 1 is guaranteed that all the individuals thereafter will choose the correct
action M with high probability of at least ρ(M |lK+1,H). Consequently, in the later scenario, there
is an upper uniform bound on the time after which all individuals will choose the correct action
with at least that uniform probability.
The uniformity stated in Theorem 2 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For all ε,ψ,ν ∈ (0,1) there exists a finite K = K(ψ,ν,ε) such that for all pairs
(F L , F H ) which are (ψ,ν) - informative, PH({at}t≥1 : at = M for all t > K) > 1− ε.
The next theorem analyzes the rate of converges of l regardless of the type of the private belief
distributions which may be bounded or unbounded. To this end, we shell first introduce the notion
‘close’ private beliefs.
Definition 2. A pair of cdfs (F L , F H ), is ε - close given l if
max
m
|ρ(m|l,H)−ρ(m|l, L)| < ε. (9)
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In words, private beliefs are ε close given l if it induces sufficiently close transitions for all ac-
tions m. In the following theorem the assumption of (ψ,ν) - informativeness is relaxed, more over,
the theorem holds for all types of private beliefs which might be either bounded or unbounded.
In particular, it is shown that the rate of converges does not depend on the specification of the
private beliefs but only on the distance between the corresponding transitions.
Theorem 3. For all ε,ψ,ν ∈ (0,1) there exists a finite K = K(ψ,ν,ε) such that for all pairs
(F L , F H ) and for all n> 0, there is a PH - probability of at least (1− ε) that:
1. Either (F L , F H) is
ψ
tν - close given lt in all, but K periods t in {1...n} or
2. lt < ε for all t > n.
In words, as individual n observes the whole previous actions as well as the past associated
transitions, Theorem 3 asserts that, given an arbitrarily small ε > 0, there exists a finite uniform
bound K , which is independent of any pair of private belief, such that if that individual faces more
than K periods in which the corresponding transitions were sufficiently differed, then, whenever
the private beliefs are unbounded, not only that the public belief process at time n, ln, falls below
ε near the cascade set but, the second part of theorem ensures us that individual n is guaranteed
that all the individuals thereafter will choose the correct action M with high probability of at least
ρ(M |ln,H). Consequently, in the later scenario, there is an upper uniform bound on the time after
which all individuals will choose the correct action with at least that probability.
When the private belief are (ψ,ν) - informative the first part of Theorem 3 is ruled out and
hence Theorem 3 is coincided Theorem 2. As a result, with a probability of at least (1 − ε) the
correct action will be chosen after exactly K periods.
By (Smith and Sorensen (2000), Lemma 2) we know that, with bounded belief, there exist 0<
l
−
<
−
l<∞ such that the non-empty cascade sets corresponding to actions 1 and M are J¯1 = [
−
l ,∞]
and J¯M = [0, l
−
], respectively, where all the other cascade sets are possibly empty. Consequently,
since from Theorem 3 we are provided with only two events which occurs with high probability 1−
ε, and the event in which the process l lies in J¯1 is obtained with a positive probability, we conclude
that incorrect ‘learning’ (.i.e. herding) must occur very ‘slowly’ as the difference between the
transitions becomes less that
ψ
tν in all but few periods K , whereas lt might converge ‘quickly’ to J¯M .
Furthermore, the constant K is universal as it does not depend on underlying pair’s specification.
4 Supermartingale characterization
Intuitively, a supermartingale is a process that decreases on average. Let us further consider the
following class of supermartingales called active supermartingales. This notion has been first
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introduced in Fundernberg and Levine (1992) who study reputations in infinitely repeated games.
Consider an abstract setting with a finite set Ω and probability measure P in ∆(Ω) equipped with
a natural filtration.
Definition 3. A non-negative supermartingale L˜ := { L˜t}
∞
t=0 is active with activityψ ∈ (0,1) under
P if
P({ω : |
L˜t(ω)
L˜t−1(ω)
− 1|>ψ}|ω˜k−1) >ψ
for P - almost all histories ω˜t−1 such that L˜t−1(ω˜)> 0.
In word, a supermartingale has activity ψ if the probability of a jump of size ψ at time t
exceeds ψ for almost all histories. Note that L˜ being a supermartingale, is weakly decreasing in
expectations. Showing that it is active implies that L˜t substantially goes up or down relative to
L˜t−1 with probability bounded away from zero in each period. Fundenberg and Levine (1992)
Theorem A.1, showed the following remarkable result
Theorem 4. Let ε > 0, ψ ∈ (0,1), and l0 > 0. Then, for all L¯ ∈ (0, l0) there is a time K <∞ such
that
P({ω : sup
t>K
L˜t(ω) ≤ L
−
}) ≥ 1− ε
for every active supermartingale L˜ with L˜0 ≡ l0 and activity ψ.
Theorem 4 asserts that if L˜ is an active supermartingale with activity ψ then there is a fixed
time K by which, with high probability, L˜t drops below L
−
and remains below L
−
for all future
periods. It should be noted that the power of the theorem stems from the fact that the bound, K ,
depends solely on the parameters ε > 0, ψ and L
−
, and is otherwise independent of the underlying
stochastic process P.
Nevertheless, in the framework of social learning, non of the public belief likelihood ratios
lt exploits the active supermartingale property for any ψ ∈ (0,1), as equation (6) implies that
its transitions converges to one. Hence, we are strongly motivated to extend Definition 3 to a
much wider class of supermatingales which will include lt , and furthermore, as lt converges to
the cascade set {0}, extend Theorem 4 to achieve a uniform bound on the rate of convergence of
lt . To this end, let us introduce the following new wide class of supermartinglaes, called weakly
actives.
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Definition 4. Let ψ, v ∈ (0,1). A non-negative supermartingale L˜ := { L˜t}
∞
t=0 is weakly active with
activity ψ and rate v under P if
P({ω : |
L˜t+1(ω)
L˜t(ω)
− 1|>
ψ
(t + 1)v
}|ω˜t) >
ψ
(t + 1)v
(10)
for all histories ω˜t such that L˜t(ω˜)> 0.
In words, a supermartingale has activity ψ and rate v if the probability of a jump of size
ψ
(t+1)v
at time t exceeds
ψ
(t+1)v
for almost all histories. L˜ being a supermartingale, is weakly decreasing
in expectations. The assumption that it is weakly active asserts that it cannot decay or grow too
slowly. That is, there exists a bound on the rate of converges of L˜t , in such a manner that L˜t must
not go up or down relative to L˜t−1 in a considerably rate with a probability converges to zero in
the same bounded rate. It should be noted that the class of supermartingales corresponding to
v = 0 and a constant ψ ∈ (0,1) includes those processes which were defined in Definition 3. In
the next theorem the uniformity result presented in Theorem 4 is extended to include the class of
all weakly active supermartingles.
Theorem 5. Let ε,ψ, v ∈ (0,1), and l0 > 0. Then, for all L¯ ∈ (0, l0) there is a time K <∞ such
that
P({ω : sup
t>K
L˜t(ω) ≤ L¯}) ≥ 1− ε
for every weakly active supermartingale L˜ with activity ψ and rate v with L˜0 ≡ l0.
4
The power of the theorem stems from the fact that the integer K , depends only on the pa-
rameters l0, ε > 0, ψ, v and L¯, and is otherwise independent of the particular supermartingale
selected. The theorem asserts that if L˜ is a weakly active supermartingale, then there is a fixed
time K by which, with high probability, L˜ drops below L¯ and remains below L¯ for all future
periods.
Theorem 6. For everyψ, v ∈ (0,1), there exists a pair of cdfs, F H
(ψ,v)
, F L
(ψ,v)
, such that the induced
public belief likelihood ratio is a weakly active supermartingale with activity ψ and rate v.
It should be emphasized that the values of ν are restricted to be varied between in (0,1). If
ν= 0 then inequality (10) takes the form of an active supermartingale which rules out equations
(6), if ν > 1 on the other hand, then the process lt fails to satisfy the uniformity property as stated
in Theorem 6.
4Note that Theorem 5 holds for every initial value l0, in particular, here it is implemented for l0 ≡ 1.
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5 Efficiency
The expected time until individuals stop taking the wrong action can be either finite or infinite
as the induced stochastic process converges ‘slowly’ to the cascade set. Conceptually, this section
further studies how the learning efficiency might be evaluated. To this end, let us consider the
following stopping times; the first time of the correct action τ = in f {t : at = M}, the aggregate
amount of the incorrect actions N = |{t : at 6= M}|, the time to learn TH = min{t : an = M for all
n≥ t}, and the time of the first mistake T1 = min{t : at 6= M}. The learning efficiency is referred
to the finite expected value of these random variables.
The next theorem asserts that whenever the corresponding cdf’s are (ψ, v) - informative then
the expected time of the first correct guess is finite. And on top of that, under a mild condition on
the cdfs’ derivative (which plainly do not admit fluctuations around the cascade set), the expected
time of the total number of the incorrect actions is finite as well. Moreover, both finite expectations
are uniformly bounded by a bound which is merely depends on the level of the informativeness’
parameters (ψ, v).
For the finite expectation of TH the subsequent theorem asserts that there exist (large enough)
ψˆ and (small enough) νˆ such that for any ψ > ψˆ and ν < νˆ, and for any corresponding cdf’s
which are (ψ, v) - informative, the expected time to learn is finite.
Before proceeding to the first theorem some preliminary is required. Given a prior and a pair
(F L , F H ), F is denoted to be the (unconditional) distribution of the private belief being H. In
addition, F is called smoothly monotone near zero if pF ′(p)→ 0 as p → 0.
Theorem 7. For all ψ,ν ∈ (0,1) there exists K = K(ψ,ν) such that for all pairs (F L , F H ) which
are (ψ, v) - informative:
a. EH[τ] < K .
b. If in addition F is smoothly monotone near zero then EH[N] < K .
The finite expected time to learn’s proof relies on the result of the following proposition which
plainly asserts that whenever the cdf’s are (ψ, v) - informative for sufficiently large ψ and suffi-
ciently small ν, then the event for which the incorrect action is taken place reduces ‘rapidly’ and
uniformly to zero.
Proposition 1. There exist ψˆ, vˆ ∈ (0,1), and K = K(ψˆ, vˆ) > 0, and α= α(ψ, v) > 2, such that for
all ψ > ψˆ and ν < vˆ, and for all pairs (F L , F H ) which are (ψ, v) - informative,
PH(at 6= M) < K
1
tα
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for all t ≥ 1.
Theorem 8. There exist ψˆ, vˆ ∈ (0,1) and K = K(ψˆ, vˆ) > 0 such that for allψ > ψˆ and ν < vˆ, and
for all pairs (F L , F H) which are (ψ, v) - informative, EH[TH] < K . Furthermore, K(ψ, v) decreases
as ψ→ 1 and ν→ 0.
Proof of Theorem 8. By proposition 1 there exist K = K(ψ, v), and a pair (F L , F H)which is (ψ, v)
- informative such that for all t ≥ 2, PH(at−1 6= M) < K ·
1
(t−1)α
. Thus, denoting K1 = 1+K
∞∑
t=2
t
(t−1)α
and since {TH = t} ⊆ {at−1 6= M} for all t ≥ 2 we obtain
E[TH |s = H] =
∞∑
t=0
t · PH({TH = t})
≤ PH({TH = 1})+
∞∑
t=2
t · PH({at−1 6= M})
≤ 1+ K
∞∑
t=2
t
(t−1)α
≤ K1.
By a symmetric argument the same conclusion holds for s = L. Consequently, the expected time
to learn E[TH] is uniformly bounded by a constant which solely depends on (ψ, v) and the result
follows.
As T1 < TH the following corollary is inferred.
Corollary 2. There exist ψˆ, vˆ ∈ (0,1) and K = K(ψˆ, vˆ) > 0 such that for all ψ > ψˆ and ν < vˆ,
and for all pairs (F L , F H ) which are (ψ, v) - informative, EH[T1] < K .
6 Concluding remarks
The classical setting of asymptotic learning is revisited where individuals converge to the correct
action and correct belief regardless of their private information assigned to the incorrect state of
the world. Nevertheless, recent papers have shown that the prospective time to learn may take
ages to infinity. The paper proposes a simple criterion on the private information structures and
focuses on the result in time to learn appraisal. Whenever the private information is unbounded,
the criterion constitutes a characterization in which the induced time to learn shares a common
sharp bound. It is further argued that the learning is efficient. For a general information structure,
it provides a universal constant K such that with any desired degree of precision at any fixed time
n, only two scenarios hold; either the learning has begun or the proposed criterion fails to hold in
more than K periods by n.
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The underlying technical results are mathematical; A new class of supermartingales (called
weakly active) is introduced, linked, and proved to admit a uniform rate of convergence. This
extends an earlier result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992).
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APPENDIX
A Some missing proofs
Significant savings in computational cost, the proof of the Theorem 1 is provided for the case in
which M = 2, where the payoff function is given by
1 2
H 0 1
L 1 0
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Thus, the utility of the action at = 1,2 is 1 if and only if the state of the world is H, L, respectively,
and zero otherwise.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix (ψ,ν) ∈ (0,1)2 and for ψ < b < a < 1 let
f1(t) =


a,
b,
ψ
tν
t = −1
t = 0
t ≥ 1.
Let {bt}t≥1 be a positive increasing to infinity sequence and consider the following function
f : Z→ R>
f (t) =


f1(t − 1)− f1(t),
( f1(|t| − 1)− f1(|t|))
1
e
b|t|
,
t ≥ 0
t ≤ −1.
Observe that
C :=
+∞∑
t=−∞
f (t) =
−1∑
t=−∞
[ f1(|t| − 1)− f1(|t|)]
1
e
b|t|
+
∞∑
t=0
[ f1(t − 1)− f1(t)]
=
∞∑
t=1
[ f1(t − 1)− f1(t)]
1
ebt
+ a
<
∞∑
t=1
[ f1(t − 1)− f1(t)] + a = b+ a.
(11)
Consider the following probability functions over the integers: PH(t) =
f (t)
C , P
l(t) =
f (−t)
C , t ∈ Z,
one of which is associated with an accumulated distribution function F H , F L , respectively. Note
that for all t ≥ 1
1− F H (−t) = 1C
−1∑
i=−t+1
[ f1(|i| − 1)− f1(|i|)]
1
e
b|i|
+ 1C
∞∑
i=0
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
= 1C
−1∑
i=−t+1
[ f1(|i| − 1)− f1(|i|)]
1
e
b|i|
+
f1(−1)
C
= 1C
t−1∑
i=1
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+
f1(−1)
C ,
(12)
where 1− F H (0) = 1C
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)] =
f1(0)
C . As well as
1− F L(−t) = 1C
0∑
i=−t+1
[ f1(|i| − 1)− f1(|i|)] +
1
C
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
= 1C
t−1∑
i=0
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)] +
1
C
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
= 1C ( f1(−1)− f1(t − 1)) +
1
C
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
= 1C ( f1(−1)− f1(t − 1)) +
1
C (C − f1(−1)) =
C− f1(t−1)
C
(13)
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with 1− F L(0) =
C− f1(−1)
C . From (12) and (13) we obtain
|1− F H (−t)− 1− F H(−t)| =
1
C
[ f1(t − 1)−
∞∑
i=t
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
] (14)
Now, for all s ∈ {L,H} let
F˜ s(p) =


0,
1,
F s(log(
p
1−p )),
0
1
other
be the corresponding cdf on [0,1], and observe that, due to (2), a simple calculation shows that
the corresponding threshold is given by p1(l) =
l
1+l . Hence, since
|ρ(M |lt ,H)−ρ(M |lt , L)| = |(F˜
H(pM (lt))− F˜
H(pM−1(lt)))− (F˜
L(pM (lt))− F˜
L(pM−1(lt)))|
= |(1− F˜ H(p1(lt)))− (1− F˜
L(p1(lt)))| = |(1− F˜
H(
l t
1+l t
))− (1− F˜ L(
l t
1+l t
))|
= |(1− F H(log(
(
lt
1+lt
1−(
lt
1+lt
)))− (1− F L(log(
(
lt
1+lt
1−(
lt
1+lt
)))| = |(1− F H(log(lt )))− (1− F
L(log(lt )))|
then, following Definition 1, we need to show that
|(1− F H (log(lt )))− (1− F
H(log(lt )))| >
ψ
(t + 1)ν
,
which from (14) and the fact that
|(1− F H(log(lt )))− (1− F
H(log(lt )))| = |(1− F
H (−(−log(lt )))− (1− F
H(−(−log(lt )))|
= |(1− F H(−(log( 1l t
)))− (1− F H(−(log( 1l t
)))|
becomes
f1(log(
1
lt
)− 1)−
∞∑
i=l og( 1lt
)
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
| >
ψ
(t + 1)ν
C . (15)
We will first show that f1(log(
1
l t
)−1) >
ψ
(t+1)ν
C for all t ≥ 1, then we are provided by a sufficiently
large sequence {bt}t≥1 such that inequality (15) holds for all t ≥ 1. Note that for all t ≥ 1
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f1(log(
1
l t
)− 1)>
ψ
(t+1)ν
C ⇐⇒
ψ
(l og( 1lt
)+1)ν
>
ψ
(t+1)ν
C
⇐⇒ C(log( 1l t
)− 1)ν < (t + 1)ν
⇐⇒ C
1
v [log( 1l t
)− 1]< t + 1
⇐⇒ log( 1l t
)< t+1
C
1
v
+ 1
⇐⇒ 1l t < e
( t+1
C
1
v
+1)
.
Now, using equation (4), set (iteratively) 1
l˜ t
=
t∏
t=i
1−F˜H (p1(l˜i))
1−F˜ L(p1(l˜i))
=
t∏
t=i
1−FH (l og(l˜i))
1−F L(l og(l˜i))
starting at l˜0 = 1
(corresponding to p1(l0) =
l0
1+l0
= 12 ). Hence, since for all t ≥ 0, l˜t ≤ lt and so
1
l t
≤ 1
l˜ t
, it is enough
to show that for all t ≥ 1
1
l˜t
< e
( t+1
C
1
v
+1)
.
Note that from (4) we have
log(
1
l˜t+1
) = log(
1
l˜t
(
1− F H(log(l˜t )
1− F L(log(l˜t )
)) = log(
1
l˜t
) + log(
1− F H(log(l˜t )
1− F L(log(l˜t )
).
Hence, by judicious choice of a, b, and {bt}t≥1, it is sufficient to show that the sequence {log(
1−FH (l og(l˜ t)
1−F L (l og(l˜ t)
}t≥1
is monotone decreasing to zero and that 1
l˜1
= log(
1−FH (l og(l˜0)
1−F L(l og(l˜0)
) < e
( 2
C
1
v
+1)
. For the first part, it is
sufficient to show that {log(
1−FH (−t)
1−F L (−t)
)}t≥1 is monotone converges to zero. To this end, from (12)
and (13) and the fact that
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
= C − f1(−1) we obtain
l im
t→∞
log(
1−FH (−t)
1−F L(−t)
) = log(
t−1∑
i=1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+ f1(−1)
C− f1(t−1)
) = log(
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+ f1(−1)
C )
= log( CC ) = 0.
for the monotonic of {log(
1−FH (−t)
1−F L (−t)
)}t≥1 we note that, since f1(t) decreases to zero it follows
that for all t ≥ 1 there exists a large enough b¯t such that for all bt > b¯t we have
1−FH (l og(−t)
1−F L(l og(−t)
=
t−1∑
i=1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+ f1(−1)
C− f1(t−1)
>
t−1∑
i=1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+ f1(−1)+( f1(t−1)− f1(t))
1
ebt
(C− f1(t−1))+( f1(t−1)− f1(t))
=
t∑
i=1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+ f1(−1)
C− f1(t)
=
1−FH (l og(−t−1)
1−F L(l og(−t−1)
and since the log is monotonic the result follows. For the second part, observe that we need to
show that
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f1(log(
1
l1
)− 1)−
∞∑
i=l og( 1l1
))
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
| >
ψ
2v
C
hence we must show that log( 1
l˜1
) > 1and hence, by judicious choice of a, b, {bt}t≥1, we will show
that e < 1
l˜1
< e
( 2
C
1
v
+1)
. Now, observe that, setting b1 = 0, we have
1
l˜1
=
1−FH (l og(l˜0)
1−F L(l og(l˜0)
) =
1−FH (0)
1−F L(0)
) =
f1(0)
C− f1(−1)
=
f1(0)
∞∑
i=1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
=
f!(0)
[ f1(0)− f1(1)]
1
eb1
+
1
l˜1∑
i=2
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
+
∞∑
i= 1
l˜1
+1
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
=
f1(0)
[ f1(0)− f1(1)]+
∞∑
i=2
[ f1(i−1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
.
and so, setting a = b+1 and since C < 2a from (11), it follows that e
( 2
(2a)
1
v
+1)
= e
( 2
(2b+2)
+1)
< e
( 2
C
1
v
+1)
and hence it is sufficient to show that there exists ψ < b,a such that
e <
f1(0)
f1(0)− f1(1)
=
b
b−ψ
< e
( 2
(2b+2)
+1)
. (16)
Indeed, by elementary consideration it can be shown that (16) holds for any b in the interval
[ψ,ψ( ee−1)] which is sufficiently close to ψ(
e
e−1). Denote such an element by b˜and observe that
there exists sufficiently large increasing sequence { b˜t}t≥2 such that for all bt > b˜t one has
e <
1
l˜1
=
b
(b−ψ)+
∞∑
i=2
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
ebi
< e
( 2
(2b+2)
+1)
Now setting bt = min{ b˜t , b¯t} obtain that there exists bˆt < bt such that for all t ≥ 1
f1(log(
1
lt
)− 1)−
∞∑
i=l og( 1lt
)
[ f1(i − 1)− f1(i)]
1
e bˆi
|>
ψ
(t + 1)ν
C
and the result follows. It should be noted that as the sequence {b}t t≥1 is judiciously chosen to
‘enlarge’ the tail difference between the corresponding cdf’s, the parameters a, b was chosen to
bound the first value of 1l t
.
Consider a general setting in which Ω= {0,1} where (Ω∞, f , P0, P1) is equipped with a filtra-
tion ( ft)t≥0 with f = σ(
∞⋃
t=0
ft).
Lemma 1. The process L0 ≡ 1, Lt(ω) :=
P1(ω
t )
P0(ω
t )
, t > 0, is P0−supermartingale.
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Proof. It follows that for every ω, t :
EP0[Lt |ω
t−1] = EP0[Lt−1
P1(·|ω
t−1)
P0(·|ωt−1)
|ωt−1] = Lt−1 · E
P0[
P1(·|ω
t−1)
P0(·|ωt−1)
|ωt−1] =
= Lt−1
∑
a∈Ω: P0(a|ωt−1)>0
P0(a|ω
t−1)
P1(a|ω
t−1)
P0(a|ω
t−1)
= Lt−1·
∑
a∈Ω: P0(a|ωt−1)>0
P1(a|ω
t−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ Lt−1
≤1
,
and as a result EP0[Lt |gt−1] ≤ Lt−1, P0 − a.s. It should be noted that if P1 ≪ P0 then∑
a∈Ω: P0(a|ω
t−1)>0
P1(a|ω
t−1) = 1 result in Lt being a martingale.
B The faster process and its implication
B.1 Construction
Define an increasing sequence of stopping times {τk}
∞
k=0
relative to {Lt}t≥0 and ε inductively as
follows: first set τ0 ≡ 0 and for all k > 0 if τk−1(ω) =∞ set τk(ω) =∞where for τk−1(ω) <∞
define τk(ω) to be the smallest integer t > τk−1(ω) such that either
1. P0({ω¯ :
L t(ω¯)
L t−1(ω¯)
− 1< − ε#A}| ω
t−1) > ε#A or
2.
L t(ω)
Lτk−1(ω)
(ω) − 1>
ε
2#A, or
3. if there is no such t, set τk(ω) =∞.
5
Define the faster process: { L˜k}
∞
k=0
relative to the process {Lt}t≥0 by
L˜k(ω) =


Lτk(ω)(ω),
0,
τk(ω) <∞
τk(ω) =∞.
Note that { L˜k}
∞
k=0
is defined with respect to the stopping times {τk}
∞
k=0
which is adapted to
an associated filtration whose events are denoted by ω˜k.6
Definition 5. A non-negative supermartingale { L˜k}
∞
k=0
is active with activity ψ under P if
P({ω : |
L˜k(ω)
L˜k−1(ω)
− 1|>ψ}|ω˜k−1) >ψ
for almost all histories ω˜k−1 such that L˜k−1(ω˜)> 0.
5Note that whenever condition 1 holds, τk(ωˆ) = t for all ωˆ ∈ω
t−1.
6k is interpreted as the first time that L satisfies one of the three rules, where t denotes a general time index.
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In word, a supermartingale has activity ψ if the probability of a jump of size ψ at time t
exceeds ψ for almost all histories.
Lemma 2. For all ε > 0, the faster process { L˜k}k≥0 relative to the process {Lt}t≥0 is an active
supermartingale (under P0) with activity
ε
2#A.
Proof. Since {τk}
∞
k=0
are stopping times and {Lt}t≥0 is a supermartingale, it follows by lemma 1
that { L˜k}
∞
k=0
is a supermartingale (verify). Now let ω˜ ∈ Ω∞, k > 0 such that L˜k−1(ω˜) > 0, we
need to show that
P0({ω : |
L˜k(ω)
L˜k−1(ω)
− 1|>
ε
2#A
}| ω˜k−1) >
ε
2#A
. (17)
To see this, let s = τk−1(ω˜) and note that τk−1(ω) = s, ∀ω ∈ ω˜
s and since ω˜s is cylinder it
follows that Ls(ω) ≡ Ls(ω˜) > 0, ∀ω ∈ ω˜
s, and in addition, τk(∗|ω˜
s) is a random variable which
denotes the first time after k − 1 times conditional on the event which consists all ω′s for which
τk−1(ω) = s and ω
s ∈ ω˜s. 7Hence, in terms of equation (17) it is enough to show that
P0({ω : |
Lτk(ω)(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1|>
ε
2#A
}| ω˜s)>
ε
#A
. (18)
where L∞ is defined to be the constant zero. Now note that the sets:
{rule 1} := {ω : τk(ω) satis f ies rule 1},
{rule 2 \ 1} := {ω : τk(ω) satis f ies rule 2 and does not satis f y rule 1},
{rule 3} := {ω : τk(ω) satis f ies rule 3},
are disjoint, and that for anyω, one of these three sets must be used to choose τk(ω). Hence, it is
enough to show that equation (18) holds conditional on each set and thus it holds averaging over
all of them.
Conditional on {rule 3} :
P0({ω : |
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1|> ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {rule 3}) =
P0({ω : |
0
Ls(ω)
− 1| > ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {ω : L∞(ω) = 0}) = 1.
Conditional on {rule 2 \ 1} :
1= P0({ω :
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1> ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {rule 2 \ 1}) =
P0({ω : |
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1| > ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {rule 2 \ 1}).
Conditional on {rule 1} : since condition 1 holds we obtain that τk(ωˆ) = t for all ωˆ ∈ ω
t−1 and
thus
70 < L˜k−1(ω˜) = Lτk−1(ω˜)(ω˜) = Ls(ω˜)
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P0({ω :
Lτk(ω)(ω)
Lτk(ω)−1(ω)
− 1< −
ε
#A
}| ω˜s ∩ {rule 1})≥
ε
#A
. (19)
Now note that if condition 2 was satisfied at time τk(ω)−1 then τk(ω) would not be the infimum
on all t > τk−1(ω) such that condition 1 holds at time t = τk(ω). Therefore, condition 2 was not
used at time τk(ω)− 1 just before time τk(ω), which yields that
Lτk(ω)−1(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1≤
ε
2#A
, ∀ω ∈ ω˜s.
Since for all ω that satisfies
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Lτk(ω)−1
(ω)
− 1< − ε#A and
Lτk(ω)−1
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1≤ ε2#A we have
Lτk(ω)(ω)
Lτk(ω)−1(ω)
Lτk(ω)−1(ω)
Ls(ω)
=
Lτk(ω)(ω)
Ls(ω)
< (1−
ε
#A
)(1+
ε
2#A
) = 1+
ε
2#A
−
ε
#A
−
ε2
2(#A)2
,
it follows that
Lτk(ω)(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1< −
ε
2#A
−
ε2
2(#A)2
. (20)
Combining (19) and (20) shows that
P0({ω :
Lτk(ω)(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1< −(
ε
2#A
+
ε2
2(#A)2
)}| ω˜s ∩ {rule 1}) ≥
ε
#A
,
where −( ε2#A +
ε2
2(#A)2
) < − ε2#A yields that
P0({ω : |
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1| > ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {rule 1}) =
P0({ω :
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1< − ε2#A} ∪ {ω : (
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1> ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {rule 1})≥
P0({ω :
Lτk(ω)
(ω)
Ls(ω)
− 1< − ε2#A}| ω˜
s ∩ {rule 1}) ≥ ε#A >
ε
2#A
and the result follows.
B.2 Linkage between the faster process and distance of measures
Definition 6. For ω, t > 0, P0, P1 denote by
∆(ωt−1) := ||P1(·|ω
t−1)− P0(·|ω
t−1)|| = max
a∈A
{|P1(a|ω
t−1)− P0(a|ω
t−1)|}
to be the distance between the conditional distributions P0, P1 over outcomes corresponding to
ωt−1.
The next lemma shows that given any history, ω˜t−1, the likelihood ratio is likely to substantially
fall whenever ∆(ω˜t−1) > ε
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Lemma 3. Let 0< ε < 1,0< t, ω˜, P0, P1 such that P0(ω˜
t−1)> 0 and ∆(ω˜t−1) > ε, then
P0({ω :
Lt(ω)
Lt−1(ω)
− 1≤ −
ε
#A
}|ω˜t−1) ≥
ε
#A
.
Proof. Denote A = {a1,a2, ...,aM } and note that ∀ω, t > 0 with Lt−1(ω) > 0 one has
L t(ω)
L t−1(ω)
=
P1(ωt |ω
t−1)
P0(ωt |ωt−1)
and so conditional on ω˜t−1 the random variable
L t
L t−1
is distributed, with respect to P0,
as follows:
Lt
Lt−1
|ω˜t−1 ∼


P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)
P0(a1|ω˜t−1)
, P0(a1|ω˜
t−1)
P1(a2|ω˜
t−1)
P0(a2|ω˜t−1)
, P0(a2|ω˜
t−1)
.
.
.
P1(aM |ω˜
t−1)
P0(aM |ω˜
t−1)
, P0(aM |ω˜
t−1).
Consequently, it suffices to show that for some m ∈ {1, ...,M} :
P1(am|ω˜
t−1)
P0(am|ω˜t−1)
≤ 1−
ε
M
and P0(am|ω˜
t−1) ≥
ε
M
.
By hypothesis, ∆(ω˜t−1) = max
a∈A
{|P1(a|ω˜
t−1) − P0(a|ω˜
t−1)|} ≥ ε. 8Suppose without loss of
generality that this maximum attains at m = 1, hence, |P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)− P0(a1|ω˜
t−1)| ≥ ε.
Case 1: If P0(a1|ω˜
t−1)− P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)≥ ε then
ε
M
≤ ε+ P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)≤ P0(a1|ω˜
t−1)
where dividing the last inequality by P0(a1|ω˜
t−1) yields that
ε
M
≤ ε≤
ε
P0(a1|ω˜t−1)
≤ 1−
P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)
P0(a1|ω˜t−1)
and we are done.
Case 2: If P0(a1|ω˜
t−1)− P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)≤ −ε then
0= 1− 1=
M∑
m=1
P0(am|ω˜
t−1)−
M∑
m=1
P1(am|ω˜
t−1) =
M∑
m=1
(P0(am|ω˜
t−1)− P1(am|ω˜
t−1)) =
P0(a1|ω˜
t−1)− P1(a1|ω˜
t−1)+
M∑
m=2
(P0(am|ω˜
t−1)− P1(am|ω˜
t−1))≤
−ε+
M∑
m=2
(P0(am|ω˜
t−1)− P1(am|ω˜
t−1)).
8Lemma 3 can be stated equivalently: if there exists m such that |P1(am|ω˜
t−1)−P0(am|ω˜
t−1)| ≥ ε then P0({ω :
Lt (ω)
Lt−1(ω)
−
1 ≤ − ε
#A
}|ω˜t−1)≥ ε
#A
. Hence, the negation yields that for any m : |P1(am|ω˜
t−1)− P0(am|ω˜
t−1)| < ε.
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Consequently,
ε≤
M∑
m=2
(P0(am|ω˜
t−1)− P1(am|ω˜
t−1)) ≤ (M − 1)max
2≤m
{P0(am|ω˜
t−1)− P1(am|ω˜
t−1)} ≤
Mmax
2≤m
{P0(am|ω˜
t−1)− P1(am|ω˜
t−1)},
and so εM ≤ max2≤m
{P0(am|ω˜
t−1)−P1(am|ω˜
t−1)}. W.l.o.g assume that the maximum attains at m = 2.
Hence, εM ≤ P0(a2|ω˜
t−1)− P1(a2|ω˜
t−1) which yields that
ε
M
≤
ε
M
+ P1(a2|ω˜
t−1) ≤ P0(a2|ω˜
t−1),
where dividing the last inequality by P0(a2|ω˜
t−1) we conclude once again that
ε
M
≤
ε
M P0(a2|ω˜
t−1)
≤ 1−
P1(a2|ω˜
t−1)
P0(a2|ω˜
t−1)
.
B.3 A uniform bound on the rate of convergence of all weakly active supermartingale with
activity ψ and rate ν with an initial value l0
Before we state and prove the theorem about a uniform bound on the rate of convergence, we
will use some fundamental results from the theory of supermartingales. In particular, bounds on
the “upcrossing numbers” which we introduce below. The result can be found in Neveu (1975,
Chapter 2).
Fact 1. For any positive supermartingale eL and any c > 0,
P(sup
k
eLk ≥ c) = P({ω : sup
k
eLk(ω) ≥ c}) ≤ min{1, eL0
c
}.
For the next fact fix an interval [a, b], 0 < a < b < ∞, and define the random variable:
Uk(a, b)(ω) = the number of upcrossing of [a, b] of ω up to time k; let U∞(a, b)(ω) = the total
number of upcrossing of [a, b] of ω (possibly equal to∞).
Fact 2. For any positive supermatingale eL and N > 0,
P(U∞(a, b) ≥ N ) = P({ω : U∞(a, b)(ω) ≥ N})≤ (
a
b
)N min{1,
eL0
a
}.
This is known as Dubin’s inequality.
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For the next lemma observe that an active supermartingale eL with activityψmakes jump of size
ψ with probability at least ψ in each period k where eLk > 0. Consequently, over a large number
of periods either eL has jumped to zero (and stay there since eL is a supermartingale) or there are
likely to be “many” jumps. Formally, given a time k > 0, define the random variable Jk(ω) to the
number of times k′ < k that |
eLk′+1(ω)eLk′(ω) − 1| ≥ ψ, that is Jk count the number of time up to time k
that eL faces jumps at rate of at least ψ. An active supermartingale is a point wise definition (from
time t − 1 to time t), the next lemma explains how the paths of any active supermartingale eL(ω)
looks like. The lemma asserts that there are only two types of path (P − a.s), for any given J > 0
and ε ∈ (0,1), there exists K such that either that eLK(ω) = 0 and since eL is a supermartingale
there exists k′ < K such that eLk′(ω) = eLk′+1(ω) =, ...,eLK(ω) = 0 or eLk(ω) > 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K
and there exists at least J jumps, that is there exists a sub sequence (ki)
J
i=1
⊆ {1, ...,K} such that
|
eLki+1(ω)eLki (ω) − 1| ≥ψ, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., J}. The next lemma formalizes the above idea.
Lemma 4. (An extension of Fudenberg and Levine (1992), Lemma A.4.) Let eL be an active su-
permartingale with activity (ψ, v). Then, for all 0 < ε < 1 and J > 0 there exists an integer K
such that
P({JK ≥ J} or {eLK = 0}) = P({ω : JK(ω) ≥ J} ∪ {ω : eLK(ω) = 0})≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Let 0 < ε < 1 and J > 0. Because eL has activity (ψ, v), in each period k, either eLk = 0 or
the probability of a jump of size
ψ
kv at time k exceeds
ψ
kv . Define a sequence of indicators random
variables Ik, k > 0 by
Ik(ω) =


1, eLk(ω) = 0 or | eLk(ω)eLk−1(ω) − 1| > ψkv
0, otherwise.
Now observe that since eL has activity (ψ, v) then for each k > 0,
EP[Ik] = 1P(Ik = 1) + 0P(Ik = 0) = P({ω : Ik(ω) = 1}) = P({ω : eLk(ω) = 0 or | eLk(ω)eLk−1(ω) − 1|> ψkv }) =
P({ω : eLk−1(ω) = 0} ∪ {ω : eLk−1(ω) > 0, and | eLk(ω)eLk−1(ω) − 1|> ψkv ]}) =
P({ω : eLk−1(ω) = 0}) + P({ω : eLk−1(ω) > 0, and | eLk(ω)eLk−1(ω) − 1| > ψkv ]}) ≥∑
ωk−1:eLk−1(ω)=0
P(ωk−1) +
∑
ωk−1:eLk−1(ω)>0
P(ωk−1)P({ω¯ :|
eLk(ω¯)eLk−1(ω¯) − 1| >
ψ
kv }|ω
k−1) >
∑
ωk−1:eLk−1(ω)=0
P(ωk−1)
ψ
kv +
∑
ωk−1:eLk−1(ω)>0
P(ωk−1)
ψ
kv =
ψ
kv
∑
ωk−1
P(ωk−1) =
ψ
kv ,
thus, the expectation for each Ik is more than
ψ
kv and so
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Ep[I1] + ...+ E
p[Ik] >
ψ
1
+ ...+
ψ
kv
, ∀k > 0. (21)
Now, using (21) and applying the kolmogorov’s strong law, (Jiming 2010, Chapter 6, Theorem
6.7) for the sequences (Ik)k>0 and {ak := 1+ ...+
1
kv }k>0, we obtain
1= P({ω : l im
k→∞
(I1(ω)−E
p[I1])+...+(Ik(ω)−E
p[Ik])
ak
= 0}) =
P({ω : l im
k→∞
I1(ω)+...+Ik(ω)
ak
= l im
k→∞
Ep[I1]+...+E
p[Ik]
ak
≥ l im
k→∞
(
ψ
1 +...+
ψ
kv
ak
) =ψ l im
k→∞
(
1+...+ 1
kv
ak
) =ψ}),
and so
P({ω : l im
k→∞
I1(ω)+...+Ik(ω)
ak
≥ψ}) = 1 ⇐⇒
P({ω : ∃nω > 0 s.t ∀k ≥ nω,
I1(ω)+...+Ik(ω)
ak
≥ψ}) = 1 ⇐⇒
P({ω : ∃nω > 0 s.t ∀k ≥ nω, I1(ω) + ...+ Ik(ω) ≥ψak}) = 1.
Now, denote Bk := {ω : I1(ω)+ ...+ Ik(ω) ≥ψak > J}, k > 0 and observe that since ak ↑∞ and
for any ω such that ∃nω > 0 s.t ∀k ≥ nω, I1(ω) + ...+ Ik(ω) ≥ ψak it follows that for a fixed J
there exists large enough nω < n
J
ω such that ∀k ≥ n
J
ω, I1(ω) + ...+ Ik(ω) ≥ J it follows that
9
P({ω : ∃nJω > 0 s.t ∀k ≥ n
J
ω, I1(ω) + ...+ Ik(ω) ≥ J}) = 1 ⇐⇒
P(
∞
∪
n=1
∞
∩
k=n
Bk) = l im
n→∞
P(
∞
∩
k=n
Bk) = 1.
Hence, for 0< ε < 1 and J > 0 there exists sufficiently large K > 0 such that
1−ε≤ P(
∞
∩
k=K
Bk) ≤ P(BK) = P({ω : I1(ω)+ ...+ IK (ω) ≥ J}) = P({ω : SK(ω) ≥ J}) = P(SK ≥ J),
and therefore setting the random variable SK(ω) =
∑
k<K
Ik(ω) we obtain
1− ε≤ P({ω : SK(ω) ≥ J}) = P({ω : ∃(ki)
J
i=1
⊆ {1, ...,K} s.t Iki (ω) = 1, ∀1≤ i ≤ J}) =
P({ω : ∃(ki)
J
i=1
⊆ {1, ...,K} s.t. ei t her ∃1≤ i ≤ J s.t 0= eLki (ω) = eLki+1(ω) =, ...,= eLK(ω) or
eLk(ω) > 0, ∀1≤ k ≤ K and {ω : | eLki(ω)eLki−1(ω) − 1| >ψ, ∀1≤ i ≤ J}).
(22)
9Equivalently, {ω : ∃nω > 0 s.t ∀k ≥ nω, I1(ω)+...+ Ik(ω) ≥ψak} ⊂ {ω : ∃n
J
ω
> 0 s.t ∀k ≥ nJ
ω
, I1(ω)+...+ Ik(ω) ≥ J}
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In other words, by equation (22), either eLK(ω) = 0, in which case, there exists 1≤ i ≤ J such that
0 = eLki (ω) = eLki+1(ω) =, ...,= eLK(ω), or eLk(ω) > 0, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ K and there are J jumps in all
periods (ki)
J
i=1
(and so there exists at least J jumps in 1≤ k ≤ K), that is, |
eLki(ω)eLki−1(ω) −1|>
ψ
ki
, ∀1≤
i ≤ J .
Lemma 5. Let ε,ψ ∈ (0,1), and for any 0 < c < c divide the interval [c, c] into I equal sub-
intervals with endpoints e1 = c < e2 <, ...,< eI+1 = c. Define the following events:
1. E1
c,K
= {ω : max
k≤K
eLk(ω) ≥ c},
2. E2
c,cN ,K,I
= {ω : ∃i ∈ {1, .., I+1} s.t [ei , ei+1] is upcrossed b y eL(ω) N or more times b y time K},
3. E3J ,K = {ω : JK(ω) < J and
eLK(ω) > 0},
4. E4
c,K
= {ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c}.
Then, there exist judicious choice of c, c, I ,K ,N , J such that
(a) (E4c,K)
c ⊂ (E1
c,K
∪ E2
c,cN ,K,I
∪ E3J ,K).
(b) P(E1
c,K
), P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
), P(E3J ,K) ≤
ε
4 .
Using Lemma 5 and the results on up-crossing theorem, which are reflected in facts 1 and fact
2, we will assert how the paths of an weakly active supermatingale looks like. By judicious choice
of c, c, I ,K ,N , J wewill ensure that (E4c,K)
c ⊂ (E1
c,K
∪E2
c,cN ,K,I
∪E3J ,K) and that P(E
1
c,K
), P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
), P(E3J ,K) ≤
ε
4 . We will show how this ensures that most paths of any weakly active supermartingale are:
1. Do not exceeds c for c large. (Fact 1)
2. Make “few” up-crossing of any positive interval [a, b], (Fact 2) and
3. either make “lots of jumps” or hit zero (Lemma 4).
We will use these three conditions to show that there exists large K such that, most paths remains
belowL
∼
from K on.
Proof of Part (a). We will show that for any c, c,K , J there exist I ,N such that (a) holds. Let
c, c,K , J (these determines the sets E4c,K , E
1
c,K
, E3J ,K) and suppose on the contrary that (E
4
c,K)
c ∩
(E1
c,K
)c ∩ (E2
c,cN ,K,I
)c ∩ (E3J ,K)
c 6= ; for all I ,N . Let ω ∈ (E4c,K)
c ∩ (E1
c,K
)c ∩ (E3J ,K)
c and denote by
eLω,K := {eLk(ω)}0≤k≤K to be the partial path of eL(ω) by time K .10 Since ω ∈ (E1c,K)c ∩ (E4c,K)c we
have that c ≤ eLω,K ≤ c. In addition, since ω ∈ (E3c,K)c = {ω : JK(ω) > J or eLK(ω) = 0}, and
0 < c ≤ eLω,K , it follows that the partial path eLω,K does not hit zero and hence has J or more
10Equivalently, let ω ∈ (E4
c,K
)c and assume on the contrary that ω /∈ (E1
c,K
∪ E2
c,cN ,K ,I
∪ E3
J ,K
), thus ω ∈ (E1
c,K
∪ E2
c,cN ,K ,I
∪
E3
J ,K
)c = (E1
c,K
)c ∩ (E2
c,cN ,K ,I
)c ∩ (E3
J ,K
)c
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jumps in [c, c] one of which, corresponded to the k’th jump, is of relative size of at least
ψ
k for all
k ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Now observe that in the range above c whenever |
eLK(ω)eLK−1(ω) − 1|>
ψ
K we have
|eLK(ω)− eLK−1(ω)| > |eLK−1(ω)|ψ ≥ cψ
K
. (23)
11In addition, recall that for any I we have I(ei − ei−1) = c − c, thus if we choose
I ≥
2c
c
ψ
K
+ 1 (24)
we then obtain that
[
2c
c
ψ
K
+ 1](ei − ei−1) ≤ I(ei − ei−1) = c − c (25)
and so
(ei − ei−1)≤
(c − c)
( 2c
c
ψ
K
+ 1)
≤
(c − c)
( 2c
c
ψ
K
)
=
c
ψ
K
2
(c − c)
c
≤
c
ψ
K
2
. (26)
which yields that the width of each sub-interval is less than
c
ψ
K
2 .
Therefore, each jump of eL of a relative size of ψK in the partial path eLω,K that remains between
c and c must cross (cover) at least one of the sub-intervals [ei , ei+1]. Consequently, each k
′ th
jump of eL of a relative size of ψk in the partial path eLω,K that remains between c and c must cross
(cover) at least Kk sub-intervals [ei , ei+1].
12 As a result since eLω,K has J or more jumps of a relative
size of {
ψ
k }
J
k=1
across sub-intervals in I by time K it follows that J jumps covers at least
J∑
k=1
K
k
sub-intervals by time K . Therefore eLω,K must cross (in the worst case) at least one sub-interval
⌊
J∑
k=1
K
k
I ⌋ ≥
J∑
k=1
K
k
I −1=
K
J∑
k=1
1
k
I −1 times, and hence, after J jumps there must be at least one sub-interval
that is up-crossed, by eLω,K at least
N˜ :=
1
2
(
K
J∑
k=1
1
k
I
− 1)− 1
times.13 Consequently, we obtained that for ω ∈ (E4c,K)
c ∩ (E1
c,K
)c ∩ (E3J ,K)
c we must have that
ω ∈ E2
c,c,N˜ ,K,I
, and so ω /∈ (E2
c,c,N˜ ,K,I
)c . Hence, if we choose any N such that
11Note that it does not necessarily mean that there was a jump in time K but a bound on the size of each sub-interval
12A jump of a relative size of
ψ
K
covers at least 1 interval. Hence the first jump of a relative size of
ψ
1
covers at least K
intervals, the second jump of a relative size of
ψ
2
covers at least K
2
intervals,...,the k′ th jump of a relative size of
ψ
k
covers at least K
k
intervals.
13Notice that
J∑
k=1
K
k
sub-intervals, denoted A, are dispersed among a total of I sub-intervals, hence (in the worst case)
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N < N˜ (27)
then, since (E2
c,c,N ,K,I
)c ⊂ (E2
c,c,N˜ ,K,I
)c it follows that ω /∈ (E2
c,cN ,K,I
)c and so ω /∈ (E4c,K)
c ∩ (E1
c,K
)c ∩
(E2
c,cN ,K,I
)c ∩ (E3J ,K)
c which yields a contradiction. As a result, (E4c,K)
c ⊂ (E1
c,K
∪ E2
c,cN ,K,I
∪ E3J ,K) or
equivalently (E1
c,K
)c ∩ (E2
c,cN ,K,I
)c ∩ (E3
J ,K
)c = (E1
c,K
∪ E2
c,cN ,K,I
∪ E3
J ,K
)c ⊂ E4c,K , which is interpreted
as follows: for any ω such that the partial path eLω,K does not go above c ,(ω ∈ (E1c,K)c), does not
up-crossed any interval more than N times by time K , (ω ∈ (E2
c,cN ,K,I
)c), and jumps J or more
times by time K , (ω ∈ (E3J ,K)
c), must fall below c, (ω ∈ E4c,K).
Proof: P(E1
c,K
) < ε4 . Applying Fact 1 with c1 = (
4
ε)l0 and any K1 > 0 we obtain that
P(E1
c1,K1
) = P({ω : max
0≤k≤K1
eLk(ω) ≥ c1})≤ P({ω : sup
k≥0
eLk(ω) ≥ c1}) ≤
min{1,
eL0
c
} = min{1,
l0
( 4ε )l0
} = min{1, ε4} =
ε
4 .
Note that the above inequalities hold regardless of how we pick K1.
Proof: P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
)< ε4 . Following inequality (24) we set
I =
2c
c
ψ
K
+ 2, (28)
and by diving the right hand side equality of inequality (25) by I ei we obtain
0<
ei−1
ei
= 1−
(c − c)
I ei
< 1−
(c − c)
I c
.
Hence, applying Fact 2 with any interval [ei+1, ei] together with (26) we obtain that the probability
of N or more up-crossings for any given sub-interval is not more than
P(U∞(ei−1, ei)≥ N ) = P({ω : U∞(ei−1, ei)(ω) ≥ N}) ≤ (
ei−1
ei
)N min{1,
eL0
ei−1
}< (
ei−1
ei
)N min{1,
eL0
c } ≤
(1−
(c−c)
I c
)N
eL0
c .
Consequently, the probability that some sub-interval is up-crossed N or more times is no more
than
each sub-interval in I is covered by at least J
I
elements from A, and since
J∑
k=1
K
k
I
might not be an integer we have that
at least one interval in I is covered ⌊
J∑
k=1
K
k
I
⌋ ≥
J∑
k=1
K
k
I
− 1 times.
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P({ω : At least one o f the inter val [ei−1, ei] is upcrossed b y eL(ω) N or more times b y time K}) =
P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
) ≤ P(U∞(ei−1, ei) ≥ N )≤ I(1−
(c−c)
I c
)N
eL0
c ,
(29)
and so in order to obtain P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
) ≤ ε4 we force (1−
(c−c)
I c
)N ≤ ε4
1
I
ceL0 where taking log of both
sides yields N ≥
l og( ε4
1
I
ceL0 )
l og(1−
(c−c)
I c
)
. Hence taking any
N ≥
log( ε4
1
I
ceL0 )
log(1−
(c−c)
I c
)
(30)
yields that P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
)≤ ε4 .
Proof: P(E3J ,K)<
ε
4 . From inequalities (27) and (30) we have
log( ε4
1
I
ceL0 )
log(1−
(c−c)
I c
)
≤ N <
1
2
(
K
J∑
k=1
1
k
I
− 1)− 1, (31)
thus set N =
l og( ε4
1
I
ceL0 )
l og(1−
(c−c)
I c
)
and notice that
(2N+3)I
K −→ 0,
K→∞
hence there exist sufficiently large J3 and
sufficiently large K3 which satisfy the right hand side of (31), that is,
(2N+3)I
K3
<
J3∑
k=1
1
k , and so there
exists J4 > J3 > 0 such that
(2N+3)I
K3
<
J3∑
k=1
1
k <
J4∑
k=1
ψ
k (check for
ψ
kv for v > 1). Now applying Lemma
(4) with ε4 , J4 there exists a sufficiently large K ≥ K3 > 0 such that
P({ω : JK(ω) ≥ J3} ∪ {ω : eLK(ω) = 0}) = P({JK ≥ J3} or {eLK = 0})≥ 1− ε
4
, (32)
and so
P(E3J3,K
) = P(({JK ≥ J3} or {eLK = 0})c) = P({JK < J3} and {eLK > 0}) =
P({ω : JK(ω) < J3 and eLK(ω) > 0})< ε4 .
14The next theorem shows the existence of a uniform bound on the convergence of all active
supermartingale. The theorem’s goal is to extend Lemma 4 result and asserts how the paths of an
14Notice that by inequalities 31 one may choose any J > 2N(I + 1) + 2
31
active supermartingale looks like can be inferred from the point wise one step ahead definition of
active supermartingale.
Theorem 9. Let l0 > 0, ε > 0, and ψ ∈ (0,1) be given. Then for each L
∼
such that 0 < L
∼
< l0,
there exists K <∞ such that
P(sup
k>K
eLk ≤ L
∼
) = P({ω : sup
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
})≥ 1− ε,
for every active supermartingale eL with eL0 = l0 and activity ψ.
Proof. Given ψ, l0L,ε ∈ (0,1),
∼
we conclude that by choosing the following judicious choice of
c, c, I ,K ,N , J : c = ε4 L∼
, and c = (4ε)l0, and I =
2c
cψ + 2 (large enough), and N =
I 4ε
eL0
c
ln(1+ψ′) and
J = 2I(N + 1) + I + 1 (large enough), and large enough K which satisfies the conditions of (32),
we obtain that
(E4c,K)
c ⊂ E1
c,K
∪ E2
c,cN ,K,I
∪ E3J ,K and P(E
1
c,K
), P(E2
c,cN ,K,I
), P(E3J ,K) <
ε
4
.
This yields that
P({ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) ≥ c}) = P((E4c,K)c)< 3ε4 (33)
and so
P({ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c}) = P(E4c,K)≥ 1− 3ε4 . (34)
Now, define the following stopping time v(ω) = min{0 ≤ k ≤ K : eLk(ω) < c} and observe that
{ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c} = K⋃
k=1
{v = k}. In addition, note that for each 0 ≤ k′ ≤ K , {v = k′} is
gk − adaptive and hence it can be decomposed in to finite disjoint cylinders, denoted ω
j
{v=k′}
,
and so eL is a constant strictly less than c on each one of them. Applying Fact 1 for L
∼
, c = ε4 L∼
, and
the following supermartingale
eLk,k′(ω) = eLk+k′(ω)1ω j
{v=k′}
(ω)
yields that
P({ω : sup
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
}|ω
j
{v=k′}
) ≤ min(1,
eL0,k′
L
∼
) < min(1,
c
L
∼
) = min(1,
ε
4 L∼
L
∼
) =
ε
4
. (35)
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Since the sets {v = k}, k ≥ 0 are disjoint we can infer by taking the average of (35) on all cylinders
ω
j
{v=k′}
corresponding to all {v = k}, that
P({ω : sup
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
}|{ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c}) < ε
4
, (36)
and we can conclude by (36), (34), (33) that
P({ω : max
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
}) = P({ω : max
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
}|{ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c})P({ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c})+
P({ω : max
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
}|{ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) ≥ c})P({ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) ≥ c}) <
ε
4 P({ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) < c}) + P({ω : max
k>K
eLk(ω) ≤ L
∼
}|{ω : min
k≤K
eLk(ω) ≥ c})3ε4 ≤ ε4 · 1+ 1 · 3ε4 = ε.
33
